We consider the interaction of two countries regarding strategic choices on privatization policy in an international mixed market under an open economy. We demonstrate that the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only on the relative efficiency of the state-owned enterprise, but also on trade policy. We show that the international competitive equilibrium involves less privatization and a higher tariff, even though they are jointly suboptimal.
Introduction
In recent decades, we have witnessed a widespread wave of privatization, which has had a remarkable impact on society. For example, based on the various empirical results, [1] Megginson and Netter (2001), [2] Megginson and Sutter (2006) and [10] Ethugala (2011) have reported that privatization generates positive effects in the society as well as at the privatized firms. [3] Barcena and Garzon(2005) and [4] Han and Ogawa(2008) considered a two-country model to incorporate the strategic interaction on privatization policy between two governments, and [5] Chang (2005) , [6] Chao and Yu(2006) , and [7] Yu and Lee(2011) constructed a mixed oligopoly model to examine the effect of trade policy on privatization policy.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interaction of two governments regarding the strategic choice on privatization under trade policy. We show that the equilibrium degree of privatization depends not only on the relative efficiency between a state-owned enterprise and private firms, but also on the trade policy. In particular, we examine the relationship between optimal privatization and tariff policies in an international market and show that the competitive optimal degree of privatization in the local country is always lower than the global optimum, but the competitive optimal degree of tariff in the local country is always higher than the global optimum. Therefore, the international competitive equilibrium involves less privatization and a higher tariff, even though they are jointly suboptimal.
The Model and Analysis

Open economy model: two country case with free trade
Suppose that there are two countries: one is the home country (1) and the other is the foreign country (2). They produce homogeneous products and can trade those products. The home country and foreign country both have symmetric duopoly situations. We assume that the home state-owned enterprise(SOE) and private enterprise(PE) in each country can produce products, but PE only export them to the foreign country. Each country would impose a tax on the imports that are produced by the PE in the other country and investigate the interaction between privatization and tariff policies.
The The firm's behavior is constrained by its ownership structure. We suppose that the PE maximizes its profits, while the SOE maximizes the objective of the government, which is defined as social welfare. Following the partial privatization model of [8] Matsumura(1998) and [9] Lee and Hwang(2003), we also assume that the manager of the partially state-owned enterprise-a semi-SOE-maximizes the shareweighted objectives between social welfare and profit. In the process of privatization, the government transforms the complete SOE into a semi-SOE, which is jointly owned by both the government and private investors. Then, decision-making behaviors of the SOE should take into account both the objectives of the government and the private sector.
Let refer to shares owned by private investors (or weights put on the profit). Then, can be used to measure the degree of privatization; that is, the government owns a share of 1-of the SOE. When 0 , this firm is a complete SOE, which maximizes social welfare, and when 1 , it is a PE, which maximizes its profit. Therefore, SOE maximizes the share-weighted objectives between social welfare and profits, which are defined as Ti = (1-i)Wi + i si, where changes of indicate the tendency of the SOE to seek social welfare or profits in the process of privatization.
From the first-order conditions of the two SOEs and the two PEs in the two markets, we have the equilibrium outputs and market output and price: where i = 1, 2 The intuition comes from the strategic interaction between the two independent countries. As shown in Proposition 1, there is a business stealing effect from the foreign firm under an open economy, and thus, concerning its own country's welfare, each government will strategically reduce the degree of privatization to lessen the business-stealing effect. However, from the perspective of global welfare where both governments do not take the business-stealing effect into consideration at all, increasing the degree of privatization will increase the cost-saving effect from the PEs, and thus increase both the home country's welfare and the other country's welfare, i.e., global welfare. Notice that the global optimum in Proposition 3 is also increasing in k, but its increasing rate is faster than the local county optimum in Proposition 2, i.e.,
2(1 )
We now consider the general case with a tariff policy. Then, profits of the PE in country i will be expressed as
. The home country's social welfare Wi = CSi + si + pi +tiqej. Again, the PE maximizes its profit, and the SOE maximizes the share-weighted objectives between social welfare and profits, Ti = (1-i)Wi + i si .
From the first-order conditions of the two SOEs and the two PEs in the two markets, we have equilibrium outputs and market output and price are
.
Proposition 2:
Under an open economy with a tariff, the competitive equilibrium degree of privatization is partial privatization and is higher than without a tariff when the SOE is not very inefficient.
Proof: The differentiation of W i with respect to i and t i yields:
Assuming the interior (non-zero) solutions for equilibrium, we have the following equilibrium of privatization and tariff: . Notice that both equilibriums of privatization and tariff are increasing in k. Therefore, we have
The intuition is as follows. Compared to the free trade case, the government can use the tariff strategically to control the business-stealing effect from foreign countries. Furthermore, the home country has an additional income source from the tariff, which provides the home country with an incentive to increase the degree of privatization in order to increase revenue from the tariff.b Then, from the perspective of strategic interaction, given the other country's lower privatization level and higher tariff level, it is beneficial for the home country to have less privatization and a higher tariff to reduce the business-stealing effect in its home country and raise tariff revenue.
It is noteworthy that the globally optimal degree of privatization with a tariff is equal to that without a tariff since the global optimal tariff is zero, which means free trade yields global optimum.
Proposition 3:
If each country sets the local country optimal tariff under an open economy, the equilibrium degree of privatization is lower than the degree of global optimal privatization without a tariff.
Proof:
The differentiations yields 
